Combating shoulder-surfing: a hidden button gesture based scheme by Rodrigues, Mário Amilcar Freitas

COMBATING SHOULDER-SURFING  
A HIDDEN BUTTON GESTURE BASED SCHEME 
MASTER’S THESIS 
 
 
 
Mário Amílcar Freitas Rodrigues 
Student No. 2012203 
 
Universidade da Madeira 
Masters in Informatics Engineering 
amilcarrodrigues[at]gmail[dot]com 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Vassilis Kostakos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
This project describes an authentication technique that is shoulder-surfing 
resistant.  Shoulder surfing is an attack in which an attacker can get access to 
private information by  observing the user’s interaction with a terminal, or by 
using recording tools to record the user interaction and study the obtained 
data, with the objective of obtaining unauthorized access to a target user’s 
personal information.  The technique described here relies on gestural analysis 
coupled with a secondary channel of authentication that uses button pressing.  
The thesis presents and evaluates multiple alternative algorithms for gesture 
analysis, and furthermore assesses the effectiveness of the technique. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 From watchwords to retina scans 
Since long there has existed a need to protect information. In old times a type of authentication called 
the watchword was used as a way of securing the communication of orders between soldiers, to 
assure that the information would not be spread to an enemy, and verify that all the guards were 
who they were. Back then it was already necessary to transmit these watchwords in extremely 
secure ways that would avoid external access to it [1].  
Nowadays multiple forms of authentication have come to exist, some pay more attention to security 
by focusing on techniques that increase the complexity or attempt to hide completely the 
authentication token from the exterior, others are not so secure but became more commonly used 
due mostly to their ease of use and memorability. Some even use unique parts of the human body as 
an authenticator like a retina scan system. But yet most of these popularly known authentication 
systems can still be breached, be it through observation or replication. Even the most secure of 
authentication systems can be breached if there is a way to observe the user interaction with the 
secured system and a way to replicate the authentication key. 
Be it a complex video and audio recording system or to the simple act of looking over the shoulder of 
another person while entering a password on a computer, these acts have come to be known as 
shoulder-surfing attacks. This thesis focuses on this aspect of authentication security, and tries to 
find a plausible solution so that it may still feel easy to use and memorable for the user, while making 
it hard for an attacker to observe and replicate the interaction. 
 
1.2 What is Shoulder-surfing 
A shoulder-surfing attack consists of a deliberate attempt to gain knowledge of protected 
information through observation [21]. This kind of attack is also commonly known as a peeping 
attack [5]. The most common example of shoulder-surfing would be a person looking over the 
shoulder of a second person that is entering a password on a computer. This kind of unauthorized 
disclosure of information can lead to serious consequences, information misuse, and consequently 
identity theft or even theft of personal possessions. A shoulder-surfing attack is more common to 
happen during user interactions that involve user authentication. Even though the most common 
shoulder-surfing attacks happen when the attacker is close to the victim observing his actions during 
an authentication, it is not a necessary circumstance for it to be considered a shoulder-surfing attack. 
More complex means can also be used which are still considered shoulder-surfing: the attackers can 
use video cameras, electronic sensors and other tools, without the need to be present during the 
shoulder-surfing attack. Such incidents have been happening lately and have become a common 
threat [27] [28]. The main cause of this kind of attacks is a poorly designed user interface because it 
forces users to input their secret directly, thereby enabling an attacker to identify a secret visually. 
 
1.3 Combating Shoulder-surfing with hidden gestures 
To combat shoulder-surfing attacks during authentication it is necessary to find solutions that help 
protect the user from being observed during his interaction with the machine. Recently has appeared 
projects proposing the use of gestures as authenticators, by exploring the user’s kinesthetic memory 
to memorize gesture passwords [24]. It has also been suggested that this kind of authentication can 
be used as a biometric, knowing that no two persons would perform the same gesture in the same 
way [20]. This project proposes to verify the efficiency of such gesture authentication methods and 
explore ways to hide gesture passwords, from any kind of possible shoulder-surfing attacks. In this 
project it is proposed a way to hide and compare gesture passwords, in which a set of gestures will 
act as an authenticator that is only read when a certain hidden button is pressed, making it extremely 
hard for any successful shoulder-surfing attack to occur. This concept can be even converted in 
various types of input schemes that would require a gesture as a password, be it obtained from a 
coordinate system, or an accelerometer.  
 
1.4 Organization 
This document is organized as follows: Section 2 will explore existing information about 
shoulder-surfing and authentication systems, and displays some of the current projects created to 
combat-shoulder-surfing with a personal evaluation of which, ultimately comparing them. Section 3 
will describe the creation and development of the Hidden Button Gesture system, an application to 
test and evaluate the security of any gesture input obtained through accelerometer. Section 4 will 
describe the tests created using the application and results obtained development and evaluation. 
Finally Section V will describe the potential of hidden button gesture password and future options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Shoulder-Surfing 
The effectiveness of a shoulder-surfing attack is highly dependent on the adversary’s ability to record 
the victim’s interaction with the system. 
During a shoulder-surfing attack the attacker stands near the target user and observes his actions to 
attempt steal his/her secret. Some measures are useful against this attack such as a privacy filter, 
which is an effective measure to some degree. Yet other forms of shoulder-surfing have emerged and 
changed the threat model, as an attacker can also use a video camera, or other tools to capture an 
authentication action at a safer distance, and record it for later use. This attack method has been used 
in actual incidents around the world in ATM scams [5]. We can distinguish between these two types 
of shoulder-surfing attacks as cognitive shoulder-surfing and recording-based shoulder-surfing. 
Cognitive shoulder-surfing  
The attacker stands behind the victim and looks over him/her to obtain passwords, PINs or other 
sensitive information. Despite its effectiveness against normal PIN entry schemes, this type of 
shoulder-surfing attacks is relatively easy to defend against since shoulder-surfers are limited by 
their cognitive capabilities [3]. This can also be done in relative distance with usage of spying devices 
such as binoculars. 
Recording based shoulder-surfing 
With the help of advanced technologies, such as concealed miniature cameras and video mobile 
phones, the adversaries’ capabilities of observing and recording the login process have improved 
significantly [27].  This class of shoulder-surfing attacks has become a serious threat to many 
security applications that rely on the combination of magnetic stripe cards and PINs to perform the 
authentication [3]. Even though it is very unlikely that more than two authentication processes will 
be done by the same user on the same device within a reasonable time frame, with this method, just 
one observation might be enough to get all the info.  
Entities involved in shoulder-surfing attacks 
A shoulder-surfing attack always includes two types of entities, the shoulder-surfer who performs 
the attack, and the target user, who holds the private information. 
Shoulder-surfer: 
• Needs to accurately reconstruct every part of the input. 
• Can be probably several feet away from the terminal, during cognitive shoulder-surfing. 
• Might not even be present, in the case of recording based shoulder-surfing. 
 
Target user: 
• Knows the secret needed to access the information, and is only looking for errors. 
• Is close to the terminal where the data is being entered and can view what is on the screen 
with relatively low contrast. 
• The target user is always present. 
These differences should be exploited when producing an interface that combats shoulder-surfing 
attacks [12]. 
 
The shoulder surfing threat is an issue that is still not taken seriously enough by executives and 
workers which hold important confidential data on their devices. 65% of the businesses in the UK do 
not offer a comprehensive security policy that combats the issue of shoulder-surfing. Important 
executives appear to not worry about reviewing confidential information on a laptop in public places, 
leaving them at the mercy of complete strangers nearby. According to research done by 3M 55% of 
management professionals questioned admitted to working on their laptops while on public 
transport or in shared work places at least once a week [17].  
Security breaches resulting from lost or stolen laptops can result in serious penalties, including 
heavy fines or permanent bans from obtaining and holding customer details in the future. This 
demonstrates the severity of such laxity in the eyes of regulatory bodies. Ineffective security policy 
enforcement can have a detrimental impact not only on the organization but also on public 
confidence in personal data protection and the individuals' right to privacy [17]. 
 
2.2. Authentication 
As shoulder-surfing attacks are mostly focused on obtaining authentication information, it is 
necessary to know what is authentication and what different systems exist. 
Three distinct steps can be identified during the utilization of a secured system: identification (asking 
the user to identify himself), authentication (the action of providing the user’s evidence of his 
identity) and authorization (allowing an authenticated person to access a set of actions, according to 
his identity) [13].  
During an authentication process the system determines whether the person being authenticated has 
possession of the pre-agreed secret. If the user proves knowledge of the secret, the system will 
authorize the person to access the system. In the case of biometrics, the system records a digital 
representation of some aspect of a person's physiology or behavior at enrollment, and this is 
confirmed at authentication time [13]. 
Authentication systems 
Authentication systems are usually categorized by the number of factors that they incorporate.  The 
three factors most often taken into consideration are: 1) something the user knows (example: a 
password), 2) something the user holds (for example, an ID badge or a cryptographic key), 3) 
something the user is (example: a finger print or other biometrics) [2]. Recent works take in account 
a fourth factor 4) something the user recognizes (for example, identifying objects within a picture) 
[13]. Identifying authentication systems this way by relating them to what the user does is a good 
scheme but it is not completely correct. For instance, a password is not exactly known: it is 
memorized. Therefore, it can be forgotten, either in the short term or over a longer period. And a 
biometric is simply one feature of your appearance.  
 A good way of identifying the different authentication systems is by using the following categories 
[2][13]:  
1) Knowledge-based or Memometrics (“something the user knows”): Characterized by secrecy or 
obscurity. This includes two types of passwords: random passwords in which the secret is known 
only by the user (PIN’s, passwords, and passphrases), and cultural passwords which can be 
loosely defined as “secret from most people” (challenge-questions and cognitive passwords such 
as “mother’s maiden name”). A security drawback of secrets is that each time it is shared for 
authentication it becomes less secret. 
2) Recognition-based or Cognometrics (“something the user recognizes”): This involves two types 
of systems, recognition-based that require the user to select information within a set of 
distracters (example: recognizing a picture from a set of similar pictures), and position-based 
that require the user to identify target objects based on their location (example: recognizing the 
position of an object that was previously drawn on a picture).  
3) Identity-based or Biometrics (“something the user is”): Characterized by uniqueness to a person. 
These can be distinguished as behavioral biometrics, based on an object’s usage patterns, 
latencies, or signature dynamics, and physiological biometrics, that can be based on any 
recordable physiological characteristic of the user, such as fingerprints, voice record, and even 
body geometry. The main security defense is that they are difficult to copy or forge. But unlike 
the other authentication types, biometrics is obviously not secret, and it is difficult to keep a 
fingerprint or iris secret from a determined attacker. Note that some works [3] also consider the 
personal identity information, such as the information contained on an ID card or driver’s license, 
as an Identity-based authenticator, although this kind of information is not usually used by itself 
as an authenticator. 
4) Object-Based (“something the user holds”): Characterized   by   physical   possession. This can be 
based off an object that the user holds, typically called as token. These can include typical keys 
but also, can be hardware or software devices that hold the secret information required to 
authenticate. This information is not required to be known by the user. A security drawback of a 
physical token is that, if lost, it enables its finder to enter the house. This is why many digital 
tokens combine another factor, an associated password, to protect a lost or stolen token. On the 
other hand, this also implies an advantage that if the token is lost, the owner sees evidence of this 
and can act accordingly. 
Multi-factor authentication 
Different types of authenticators can be combined to enhance security, this is called multifactor 
authentication.  For security purposes, each authenticator result must be satisfied, typically a 
Boolean AND operation is performed for the authentication results of each factor so all results must 
be affirmative [2]. A common example of multifactor authentication is a bankcard, the combination of 
a bankcard with a password can be considered a two-factor authentication, and it is a better choice 
than a card alone because the card can be stolen. 
Furkan Tari et al proposed a comparison of shoulder-surfing risks between alphanumeric and 
graphical passwords. This comparison explored the real and perceived vulnerability of four 
configurations of authentication systems (dictionary password input, non dictionary password input, 
graphical password input with mouse and the same graphical password input with keyboard). This 
study revealed a perceived higher level of vulnerability to shoulder-surfing by the use of the 
graphical password with mouse, but a much lower level of vulnerability to shoulder-surfing was 
shown using that graphical password with keyboard input. Possibly due to the speed entry with the 
keyboard, and the need to look at the keyboard and screen at same time. Non-dictionary passwords 
also proved to be vulnerable to shoulder-surfing, more than dictionary passwords or keyboard input 
graphical password, verifying that a password that is more resistant to a dictionary attack is likely 
more vulnerable to  shoulder-surfing [16]. 
 
2.3 Gesture Passwords 
Accelerometers have been increasingly integrated into mobile phones, and other devices. Such 
devices with built-in accelerometer can sense and acquire data from the user’s movement having 
become a new form of user input. 
Ming Ki Chong and Gary Madsen [23] explored ways to use this kind of input as authentication, by 
using an accelerometer to detect directional movements as gesture inputs. Following the idea that 
instead  of using  text-characters  or  images,  a  password  can  be  made  up  of  multiple  gestures: 
through  practice  and  repetition,  the  password  movements  can  gradually  consolidate into  the  
user’s  memory.  Although they had negative results when comparing them to pin input 
memorability, their work also showed a path for possible improvements. 
Fuminori Okumura et al [20] also explored the use of gestures as authentication, but in this case as a 
new biometric authentication method based on the differences between various users performing 
the same arm sweep gesture, through the usage of algorithms that help compare the consistency 
between the gestures of two users. 
 
2.4 Shoulder-surfing solutions 
PIN Entry Scheme resistant to recording-based Shoulder-Surfing 
This project proposes a scheme which is resistant against shoulder-surfing attacks conducted by 
shoulder-surfers with normal cognitive capabilities. This consists of a new PIN entry scheme in 
which the PIN is actually a sequence of 4 locations, instead of the typical sequence of 4 digits. 
Additionally, this scheme offers a relatively good level of security when the shoulder-surfer can 
record the entire login procedure for one or two times with a video device [3]. 
 
Figure 1. An example of the new PIN entry scheme, using colored patterns in displayed tables in order to improve 
its usability 
 The idea is to use the contrast between different colors to enhance the identification and 
memorization of the positions in a table. The secrets in this are: PIN code, and position. 
Click to Zoom-inside (CTZ)  
This was suggested as a new graphical password authentication mechanism. In  CTZ,  users  have  to  
click  on  one  point  of some  specific  regions  of  a  large  theme  image that consists of several  
objects,  shown  by  dotted  lines.  The user has to click 6 times to create a password. Each click in the 
specific region results  the  next  image  which  is  the  zoom  image  of  the specific  region  and  the  
user  has  to  click  again  on  some specific  areas  shown  dotted  in  this  given  image which results 
the next image. The sequence of clicked images creates a password. The user has to click the specific 
areas in the correct sequence. A wrong click leads down an incorrect path, with an explicit indication 
of authentication failure only after the final click. Users can click the regions only to the extent that 
their click-point dictates the next image. With this system genuine users would get immediate 
feedback about an error when trying to log in. When they  see an incorrect image, they know  that  
the  latest  click-point  was  incorrect  and  can immediately  cancel  this  attempt  and  try  again  
from  the beginning. The secret here would be the sequence of images [4]. 
fakePointer 
Using fakePointer, a legitimate user does not leak a secret even if an attacker captures a video record 
of an authentication interaction. The fakePointer scheme introduces two features to realize security 
against the threat. The first feature is a double-layered user interface for a secret input. This user 
interface makes it difficult for attackers to identify a secret visually.  The second feature is that 
fakePointer makes use of two secrets. One secret is a fixed secret, which is the same as that of a 
traditional authentication.  The other secret is a disposable one-time secret named “answer 
indicator” [5]. 
 
Figure 2. An example of the fakePointer interface with randomly sorted pictures behind the numbers. 
The secrets in this suggestion are PIN code and a 10 picture code. 
   
Password image and Key image  
An example of a multi-factor graphical solution was Password image and Key image. This 
authentication process comes in the form of two images. The first image is the password image which 
is sent to the user’s terminal as a challenge for password input.  This password image can be plain or 
encrypted. The password image is encrypted only if it contains some information about click points.  
In this case the password image and key image are identical [6].  
 
Figure 3. Example of a password image and a possible key image used 
The Key image is a copy of the password image which is always encrypted and signed by the 
challenger and can be validated and decrypted on the user’s handheld device. The key image contains 
enough information to show the click spots to the owner of handheld. There are some clickable areas 
in the password image. The user’s password is the click points and their order. The click points are 
clickable areas in the password image which a user can identify them by looking at the key image. 
The click points and their order are either highlighted in the key image or the user can determine 
them with some prior knowledge. 
YAGP 
Yet another graphical password (YAGP) is a position-free scheme, in which the user can draw his 
graphical password anywhere on the canvas, which makes shoulder surfing a difficult task. The 
stroke sequence cannot be reflected by the graph in YAGP, and authentication process sees it as a 
critical checking factor. This property ensures that the peeper  still  cannot  sign  in  even  if  he  
glimpses  the images, because  he could  not recall the correct stroke sequence  set  by  the  legal  
user.  YAGP also takes into account the drawing trends, which means it records the user drawing 
style to a certain extent [7]. 
  
Figure 4. Example of drawing an umbrella as a YAGP password 
 The  main  drawback  of  YAGP  is  that  it’s  hard  to redraw  the  password  precisely.  The  legal  user  
cannot always  be  assured  to  login  successfully  because  the gaps  between  user  drawings  are  
uncertain  while  the similarity threshold value is fixed [7].  
Keystroke patterns 
Keystroke identification examines the timing pattern that is produced as a typist presses the 
different keys on the keyboard. From this typing pattern, there are several unique features that can 
be extracted. One such characteristic (feature) is the key hold-down time, which is the amount of 
time that a particular key is held down. Another feature is the keystroke latency, which is the time 
between pressing two consecutive keys; we shall refer to this feature as the down–down keystroke 
latency [8]. 
EyePassword (Gaze-based password entry) 
A system that mitigates the issues of shoulder surfing via a novel approach to user input. With 
EyePassword, a user enters sensitive input (password, PIN, etc.)  by  selecting  from  an  on-screen  
keyboard  using  only  the orientation  of  their  pupils  (i.e.  the  position  of  their  gaze  on screen),  
making  eavesdropping  by  a  malicious  observer  largely impractical [9]. 
Spy-Resistant Keyboard 
This keyboard randomizes the spatial location of all characters as each password character is 
entered. This approach introduces indirection by utilizing an auxiliary mapping that allows typists to 
focus their attention on a particular part of the keyboard, while observers have to pay attention to 
and memorize the entire keyboard [10]. 
In order to select a character on the Spy-Resistant Keyboard, the typist first locates the tile that 
contains the character to be typed. They remember the mapping by noting the location of this tile. 
Next, the typist clicks on one of the interactors at the bottom of the keyboard to cycle through shift 
states and move the red underline to the desired character. Clicking on the Interactor moves the 
underline to the next character on each tile. Finally, the typist drags the Interactor towards the 
Character Tile on which the desired character resides. 
A  user’s  mobile  device  displays  a gesture  sequence  on  the  public  terminal,  and  the  user 
authenticates  to  his  device  by  shaking  it  in  the  required back-and-forth  pattern.  This scheme 
requires no secret knowledge for authentication [10].  
Convex Hull Click Scheme 
The  Convex  Hull  Click Scheme  (CHC),  is  a  graphical  password  scheme  that  guards against  
shoulder-surfing  attacks  by  human  observation,  video recording, or electronic capture [11].  
In a challenge the user must  recognize  some minimum number of his or  her  password  icons,  or  
“pass-icons,”  out  of  a  much  larger number  of  randomly  arranged  icons.  The  user  responds  to  
the challenge  by  clicking  within  the  convex  hull  of  the  pass-icons.  
 Figure 5. Example of Convex Hull scheme with 3 pass icons  
The secret in this authentication scheme is the complete set of icons selected by the user to be his 
pass-icons, of these only a few randomly chosen icons are shown during each authentication process, 
making each authentication process diferent from the previous. 
Other Solutions 
Toni Perkovic et al, sugest 3 diferent simple PIN-entry methods, designed for the partially observable 
attacker model. All of them consisting of challenge-response protocols that allow a user to login 
securely in the presence of an adversary who can observe user input. The first method "Mod10" 
consists of the user performing a simple mathematical operation, while in the other two methods STL 
and Mod10-table, the user performs a simple table lookup. All these methods show a reasonably low 
login time and minimal error rate, with Mod10 being the fastest but also the one with higher error 
rates, and also found to be the most suitable for utilization by younger users [18]. 
Pavel Lazhnikov presented a biometric system based on user’s identification through handwriting 
dynamics. This consisted of obtaining data of handwriting dynamics through two functions of time of 
changing the position of a light pen on a tablet plane x(t) and y(t), and a function of pressure changes 
of the touch-sensitive light pen tip on the tablet plane. The biometric system then compares the 
processed measurements of a user’s signature with a particular collection of templates that had been 
input earlier, and makes a decision about the closest match [25]. 
 
2.4.1 Comparison 
In [15] it was concluded that password security involves striking a balance between having enough 
rules to maintain good security and not having so many that users will take evasive action that 
compromises security. This not only applies to passwords, but to any authentication scheme. 
In order to compare the current state-of-the-art solutions to combat shoulder-surfing, it is necessary 
to look at various factors that can be divided between usability factors and security factors. 
 Usability Factors 
Regarding usability the following five concepts, mentioned in Usability Engineering by Jakob Nielsen 
[14], were taken into consideration: 
• Learnability: how easy to learn is the system so that the user can quickly start working with it. 
• Efficiency: how efficient to use is the system so that once learned, the system can be used with a 
high level of productivity. 
• Memorability: how well does the system allow a user to remember how to use it, so that the user 
is capable to return to the system after a long period of time, and still be able to use it without 
having to learn everything about it again. 
• Errors: How well does the system prevent errors and how does it recover from them if they 
occur. 
• Satisfaction: How pleasant it is to use a system and how satisfied a user is with it. (Note that this 
factor was not used in the comparison due to lack of data on it) 
Security Factors 
Security systems and methods are often described as strong or weak. When used in relative terms, 
the meanings are clear. A door with a lock offers stronger security than one with no lock. In order to 
measure absolute strength and weakness of security systems the following is a possible way: A 
strong system is one in which the cost of attack is greater than the potential gain to the attacker. 
Conversely, a weak system is one where the cost of attack is less than the potential gain [2]. To 
evaluate the security of a system we must focus on which attacks can be done to it. In this 
comparison were considered the following factors directly related to shoulder-surfing attacks: 
• Cognitive-based resistance: based on how easy is it to observe the user interaction. 
• Recording-based resistance: based on how easy is it to record the user interaction with the 
system using any tool. 
• Secret strength: based on how much data should be gathered during successful attacks, in order 
to obtain the secret information.   
• Brute-force resistance: based on how long would it take to discover the authentication 
information by trying every possible combination. As it won’t matter how well hidden is the 
authentication process, if the user can easily try all possible combinations. 
 
 
Comparison Results 
Based on the usability and security factors, a table was built in which each solution was evaluated 
using a score system. The scoring system chosen had a short range (from 1 to 5, with 1 being less 
secure or less usable and 5 being the most secure or usable) and was based on personal opinions 
with conclusions taken from what was read about each of the solutions. The results can be seen in 
Table 1 and Table 2. 
These results allowed to obtain a graphical comparison, in which can be more easily verified, the 
relation between security and usability in the solutions that attempt to fight shoulder surfing, as it 
can be observed in Figure 6. 
 Table 1. Usability factors evaluation 
 
Table 2. Security factors evaluation
From these comparison results it was noticeable that the most secure solutions were the ones based 
in multifactor authentication. The fakePointer was considered one of the most secure of these due to 
the high quantity of shoulder surf attacks that would be needed to identify the PIN even through 
recording based shoulder surfing, yet this solution was not very usable due to the different way than 
the usual to input, and the need to get the picture password separately. Meanwhile YAGP was the 
most usable of the new solutions as it was based in a person’s ability to draw, though it failed a bit in 
security due to being possible by multiple observations of a recording based shoulder surfing, as the 
secret was totally observable during the interaction. 
 Figure 6. State-of-the-art Usability vs Security comparison 
As it can be seen in Figure 6 a balance is necessary, between the most important usability factors 
found in works like YAGP and Click to Zoom-inside and the security factors found in fakePointer and 
the EyePassword. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
 
3.1 Rationale 
During the state-of-the-art comparison it was noticed that the most usable of the solutions were the 
ones closely related to drawing or movement, consisting of an interaction that involves user 
movement leading to an input in the form of multiple coordinates or directions. On the other hand 
the solutions most secure against shoulder-surfing managed to hide the data input thanks to 
complexity during interaction. It was also noticed that there is a lack of solutions that would hide the 
user’s interaction with the system during a gesture based or graphical based input. 
A new solution for would have to be an input scheme that could hide the whole input with the user 
from outside, without hiding it from the user, and without adding too much complexity that would 
provoke incorrect use.  
 
3.2 Description and requirements 
The concept of the Hidden Button Gesture input scheme is based in a gesture or a set of gestures that 
would act as an authenticator, but that would only be read when the hidden button would be 
pressed. So even if a user would do a long movement, the only parts of it that would count as an 
authenticator would be the movements done during button pressing. This concept could be even 
converted in various types input schemes that would require a gesture as a password, be it obtained 
from a coordinate system, or an accelerometer. 
To test this concept it is necessary to create a system where gesture input data obtained from an 
accelerometer, can be processed into obtaining a comparison score between multiple gestures, in 
order to identify the degree of similarity between attempts by the same or different individuals. For 
this it would be necessary a device with an accelerometer to input gestures, preferably with small 
button on it for the button pressing.  
For this prototype the following tools were used:  
• Wii Remote™ 
• PC with Wii Remote compatible bluetooth stack 
• Microsoft Visual C#  
• WiimoteLib, open source Wii Remote library for C# 
 
This authentication system will need to be able obtain and analyze the movement, and button 
pressing data, obtained from the Wiimote, in order to authenticate as the real password. Also taking 
into consideration is that humans rarely make the exact same movements; therefore a system using 
this scheme will heavily depend on a certain level of error tolerance. 
 
 
 3.2.1 Wii Remote 
The Wii Remote is a one-handed remote controller, with motion sensing capabilities. The Wii Remote 
has the ability to sense acceleration along three axes through the use of an ADXL330 accelerometer 
[21]. The Wii Remote also features a PixArt optical sensor, allowing it to determine where the Wii 
Remote is pointing. 
iMEMS® Accelerometer ADXL330 
The ADXL330 is a small, thin, low power, complete 3-axis accelerometer with signal conditioned 
voltage outputs, all on a single monolithic IC. The product measures acceleration with a minimum 
full-scale range of ±3 g. It can measure the static acceleration of gravity in tilt-sensing applications, as 
well as dynamic acceleration resulting from motion, shock, or vibration. It uses a single structure for 
sensing the X, Y, and Z axes. As a result, the three axes sense directions are highly orthogonal with 
little cross axis sensitivity [22]. 
 
3.2.2 WiimoteLib for C# 
When the Wiimote is paired with a PC, it will be identified as a HID-compliant device.  Therefore, to 
connect to the device through a C# application, it is recommended using the HID and Device 
Management Win32 APIs. 
WiimoteLib is a .NET managed library for using a Nintendo Wii Remote (Wiimote) and extension 
controllers from a .NET application. This library makes use of the P/Invoke signatures, which allows 
it to directly call methods of the Win32 API from the .NET framework. Most of the methods used in 
this application were defined by the P/Invoke Wiki resource. 
 
3.3 Implementation of the Hidden Gesture Data Processing tool 
A gesture data processing application is necessary to obtain, store and manage user gestures data, 
that will be used later to help compare algorithm efficiency. This tool acquires data from the 
Wiimote's accelerometer by storing the value of each of the accelerometer's axis (X,Y,Z) within a 
certain period of time.  
Using the WiimoteLib library functions to obtain raw gesture data from the Wii remote, the 
application was planned acording to the following class plan. 
The MainForm class would handle the user interface and calls to the system, handling the creation of 
new gestures, requests for gesture data processing, wii remote button calls, and returning results in 
xml or excel spreadsheets.  
The GestureProcessing class will handle the functions related to gesture data processing, including 
gesture data filtering functions to optimize the data used in the gesture comparison, and the 
algorithms used to compare different gestures. 
The GestureSet class will be used to create objects of the type GestureSet which may hold one or 
more gestures for the same user. The gesture class will be used to create Gesture objects each 
containing the multiple positions recorded by the Wii remote during the gesture input period. 
The XSLSEditor class will handle the creation of excel spreadsheet tables needed to visualize multiple 
gesture comparison results, that will be later used to evaluate the success of the gesture comparison. 
The XMLEditor will be used to store and load gesture data previously recorded by the system for 
future comparisons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sample gesture data, as it is stored in an XML file. 
 
Figure 8: Basic UML Class Diagram showing the dependencies between the main classes used in the application 
 
<MOTION> 
  <POSITION>136,108,108</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>138,104,104</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>135,101,101</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>134,100,100</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>130,99,99</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>128,98,98</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>123,97,97</POSITION> 
  <POSITION>119,96,96</POSITION> 
</MOTION> 
 
 3.4 Gesture Data Recording and Filtering 
The gesture data obtained through the gesture processing tool is always different every time a user 
makes a gesture input. Some variables can be used to help evaluate if two gestures are plausible for 
comparison or not. 
Relative size: Even though the user should try to be as close as possible to his previous gesture it will 
always change size. As too large differences between 2 gesture sizes have a higher probability to 
return unreliable results, and those results even if positive should be immediately considered as a 
failed input. But it should also be considered that the bigger the gesture sizes the harder it will be to 
replicate and the range of error should increase accordingly. For these tests we decided to go with 
the rule that at a minimum, one gesture should never be bigger than the double of the gesture that it 
is being compared with. 
Minimum size:  gestures with too small size lasting under 1 second are too short to be evaluated with 
precision. Therefore a minimum size should also be implemented during the gesture input of any 
user. 
Gesture creation verification: even though it is the same user, the gesture creation system should be 
able to identify if the user made a mistake, or is being too inconsistent during the gesture creation. In 
order to avoid bad gesture data. This might decrease the usability, possibly forcing a user to input the 
gesture more times than ideally, during the gesture creation, but it is a necessary factor to increase 
the precision of the system, indirectly increasing the memorability of the gesture password. An 
optimal score filter was created to filter every gesture comparison of similar size, to compare the 
most similar possible section. 
 
3.5 Gesture Comparison Algorithms 
Fuminori Okumura et al [20] proposed a method to authenticate a user through the use of 
acceleration signals obtained by an acceleration sensor embedded in cellular phones during arm 
sweep action. This method would verify the user’s acceleration signals by using a DP-matching 
algorithm which can adapt fluctuations caused by different grip. They also tested this method against 
2 other algorithms (error of squared Euclidean distance and error of angle). As these algorithms 
proved to be considerably successful they were also considered and used in this project to help 
process the data obtained in order to determine how successful the hidden gesture can be. 
 
3.5.1 Error of Squared Euclidean Distance 
The Euclidean distance between two points p and q is the length of the line segment between them. 
In Cartesian coordinates, if p = (p1, p2,..., pn) and q = (q1, q2,..., qn) are two points in Euclidean n-
space, then the distance from p to q is given by the formula:  
 
d(p,q) =   
The Squared Euclidean distance metric uses the same equation as the Euclidean distance metric, but 
does not take the square root. As a result, clustering with the Euclidean Squared distance metric is 
faster than clustering with the regular Euclidean distance.  
epq =  
In order to compare different gestures, if epq the difference between acceleration signals p and q, was 
less than predetermined threshold, we decide that those signals were from the trials of the same 
person. 
 
3.5.2 Error of Angle 
The error of angle is commonly used to evaluate the difference between acceleration signals.  
The error of the angle between two points a and b is the angle formed by them with intersection on 
the origin. In Cartesian coordinates, if a = (a1, a2,..., an) and b = (b1, b2,..., bn) are two points in 
Euclidean n-space, then the distance from a to a is given by:  
 
 
3.5.3 DP-matching 
Dynamic programming is a method of solving complex problems by breaking them into simpler 
steps.  Any algorithm, in which an optimization problem is solved by saving the optimal scores for 
the solution of every sub-problem instead of recalculating them, can be considered a dynamic 
programming matching (DP-Matching) algorithm.  
A DP-Matching algorithm is used to find the least cost path in a grid. It works by first evaluating the 
least cost distance to reach every square in the grid and then tracing back the path which 
corresponds to the overall least cost distance. 
A common DP match algorithm to search the least cost path in a grid usually consists of the 
following:  
• Initialize an array g to hold the lowest cost path to each grid square. 
• Set the values of the first element of the grid as g(0,0) and the values of the first row g(i,0) 
and first column g(0,j). 
• For each row i and column j, calculate g(i,j) as the minimum of the costs of the three possible 
ways to get to (i,j). 
 
The overall distance is 1/N * g(I,J) where I and J are the lengths of the input and stored patterns 
respectively. This algorithm involves one simple calculation per grid square and relies on the 
 observation that there are three ways to get to any grid square (horizontally, vertically or 
diagonally). In the end we have a measure of the cost of the best path but we don't know the path 
that gave rise to it. In most situations we're not really interested in the path but if we do want it can 
be reconstructed by keeping track at each grid square which of the three directions gave the 
minimum cost path. The path can then be traced back from the endpoint [26].  
DP-Matching over error algorithm data 
The DP-Matching algorithm used in this project is similar to the one used by Fuminori Okomura et al 
[20]. Although in this project DP-Matching will be tested with both the error of angle and Euclidean 
distance error, in order to verify the possible advantages or disadvantages of using this method with 
data already filtered and resized with an optimal score filter. 
There are two parameters in this algorithm, an entrance penalty and a toll penalty. In this method 
the error, calculated through the use a gesture comparison algorithm for two positions i and j err(i,j), 
is used as an entrance penalty, and a constant value as toll penalty. 
 
I and J are the number of frames in the acceleration signals a and b, toll is the toll penalty, score(i,j) is 
the grid with the lowest cost path to each grid square, err(i,j) is the value of the error of angle.  
This kind of DP-Matching algorithm has proven to be considerably successful in some kinds of 
gesture authentication systems [20] and it has also been proven useful in signature authentication 
systems [19].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. USER STUDY AND DISCUSSION 
Two user tests were organized in order to test the efficiency of the Hidden Button Gesture solution. 
The objective of the first was to verify the efficiency ratio of the algorithms, and the second test will 
analyze how effective against shoulder-surfing is the new Hidden Button Gesture solution.  
4.1. Algorithm efficiency test 
4.1.1. Description 
A few facts were considered in order to test the effectiveness of using hidden gestures as an 
authentication scheme:  
- A gesture would only be recorded while the button was pressed. 
- The gestures tested should be commonly known gestures that any person can perform. 
- The test should not be gender-specific or age specific. 
- Test it in an area with enough space to perform any gesture freely. 
 
Gestures chosen for the algorithm efficiency test: 
1 Punch 
 
 
2 Golf Swing 
 
3 Cowboy Lasso 
 
4 Whiplash 
 
5 Fencing 
 
 
6 X 
 
7 Wave 
 
 
8 Z  
9 O 
 
  
Each user was asked to perform each gesture 10 times, having a quick pause of about 3 seconds 
between each. 
The motion data of each gesture was shown on the screen to confirm that the gesture was being 
detected correctly every time. 
Each gesture was recorded as a set of coordinates that were obtained from the Wii Remote, and each 
group of gestures was kept in a XML file respective to the motion number.  
 
4.1.2. Demographics 
The users tested were 10 students and 1 teacher at the University of Madeira, and all of them had at 
least once previous experience with accelerometer equipment. Their ages ranged between 20 and 40 
years old. The user considered as the “victim” was one of these students. 
 
4.1.3. Collected data 
Comparison Steps for each of the gestures: 
 
1. Choice of the optimal gesture made by the victim, by running the comparison over the 
victim’s 10 repetitions of the same gesture and choosing the one with the best relative scores. 
 
2. Creation of a table in which all the repetitions of the same gesture by every user (victim and 
shoulder-surfers) are displayed. 
 
3. Creation of threshold/algorithm success table in which is shown the success of the algorithm 
in this gesture for different chosen thresholds, showing true positive and false positive ratios, 
and failure ratio.  
 
4. Creation of a failure rate/threshold table for each algorithm in which is shown the failure 
ratio on each gesture. (As the threshold for each comparison depends on a few factors, most 
importantly the gesture size, it was favorable the usage of multiple value ranges for each 
gesture).  
 
The threshold values were chosen based on the average scores of each gesture with each 
algorithm used were different for each algorithm, as each algorithm shows numeric results in a 
different proportion. 
The failure ratio is a calculated score based on the assumption that a very low amount of false 
positives is considered more important than a medium amount of false negatives. As a system 
with over 10% false positive ratio cannot be considered secure, while having a reasonable 
amount of false negatives is more acceptable.  
Therefore the failure ratio formula used was: Failure ratio = False negative ratio * 0.2 + False 
positive ratio * 0.8 
Example: a result of 5% false positives with 50% false negatives should be considered better than 
a result of 15% false positives and 25% false negatives.  
Threshold 
False 
Negatives 
True 
Positives 
True 
Negatives 
False 
Positives 
False Negative 
Ratio % 
False Positive 
Ratio % 
Failure 
Rate 
51941 3 7 86 14 30 14 17,2 
20000 9 1 100 0 90 0 18,0 
30000 8 2 95 5 80 5 20,0 
40000 5 5 91 9 50 9 17,2 
50000 3 7 88 12 30 12 15,6 
60000 2 8 82 18 20 18 18,4 
70000 2 8 80 20 20 20 20,0 
80000 2 8 77 23 20 23 22,4 
90000 2 8 71 29 20 29 27,2 
100000 2 8 67 33 20 33 30,4 
110000 2 8 59 41 20 41 36,8 
120000 1 9 55 45 10 45 38,0 
130000 1 9 47 53 10 53 44,4 
140000 1 9 44 56 10 56 46,8 
150000 0 10 42 58 0 58 46,4 
160000 0 10 38 62 0 62 49,6 
170000 0 10 34 66 0 66 52,8 
180000 0 10 29 71 0 71 56,8 
190000 0 10 26 74 0 74 59,2 
200000 0 10 25 75 0 75 60,0 
Table 3: Threshold comparison results obtained from gesture nº1 data (punch gesture) 
 
In this example it can be observed that the failure rate of the pre-calculated average threshold was 
17,2%, and that the optimal threshold range was near the 50000 score threshold ratio, as it had a 
15,6% failure rate.
 
 
 
 Thresholds 
Gesture 
1 
Gesture 
2 
Gesture 
3 
Gesture 
4 
Gesture 
5 
Gesture 
6 
Gesture 
7 
Gesture 
8 
Gesture 
9 
Average 
Ratio 
AvgThreshold 17,2 16,4 11,6 15,6 25,6 13,2 6,8 12,8 8,8 14,22 
20000 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 8,8 16,98 
30000 20,0 19,6 18,0 18,8 18,0 18,0 16,8 14,0 4,8 16,44 
40000 17,2 18,4 18,0 20,4 18,0 18,0 10,8 12,0 0,8 14,84 
50000 15,6 20,0 18,0 22,0 18,8 18,8 6,8 12,8 0,8 14,84 
60000 18,4 19,2 18,0 17,6 18,8 18,4 6,8 10,4 2,4 14,44 
70000 20,0 16,8 18,0 14,4 18,8 12,4 4,8 9,6 4,8 13,29 
80000 22,4 18,0 18,0 12,4 18,8 13,2 2,8 10,4 11,2 14,13 
90000 27,2 22,8 18,0 10,4 18,8 13,2 3,6 8,8 25,6 16,49 
100000 30,4 25,2 18,8 6,4 18,8 13,2 3,6 12,0 30,4 17,64 
110000 36,8 32,4 18,8 6,4 15,6 13,2 3,6 13,6 32,8 19,24 
120000 38,0 35,6 16,8 6,4 16,4 13,2 4,4 15,2 36,0 20,22 
130000 44,4 35,2 14,8 6,4 16,4 13,2 4,4 16,0 37,6 20,93 
140000 46,8 35,6 15,6 6,4 18,8 13,2 4,4 16,8 41,6 22,13 
150000 46,4 35,2 16,4 6,4 19,6 9,2 6,0 16,8 45,6 22,40 
160000 49,6 37,6 10,4 6,4 21,2 9,2 4,0 17,6 47,2 22,58 
170000 52,8 40,8 11,2 6,4 23,6 9,2 4,0 18,4 52,0 24,27 
180000 56,8 44,0 10,0 6,4 24,0 10,0 4,0 18,4 56,0 25,51 
190000 59,2 44,0 11,6 7,2 25,6 11,6 4,0 20,0 57,6 26,76 
200000 60,0 44,8 11,6 8,0 24,8 13,2 4,8 20,8 58,4 27,38 
Table 4: Threshold failure ratio comparison results for all gestures using the Euclidean Distance Algorithm 
For the Euclidean distance error algorithm it can be observed that there are more near ideal results 
at lower threshold of 4000-6000 range than at a higher threshold range. It can also be observed that 
the average threshold ratio in this gesture had a good average failure ratio of 14,22%  
 
Thresholds 
Gesture 
1 
Gesture 
2 
Gesture 
3 
Gesture 
4 
Gesture 
5 
Gesture 
6 
Gesture 
7 
Gesture 
8 
Gesture 
9 
Average 
Ratio 
AvgThreshold 16,8 40,8 17,6 20,4 44,8 13,2 19,6 12,8 12,8 22,09 
0,01 18,8 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 18,0 19,6 18,0 18,8 18,36 
0,02 18,8 26,0 18,0 22,4 18,8 19,6 19,6 18,0 10,8 19,11 
0,03 20,8 38,4 18,0 9,6 21,2 21,2 19,6 13,6 0,8 18,13 
0,04 33,6 42,8 18,8 12,0 30,8 19,2 15,6 16,0 1,6 21,16 
0,05 53,6 49,6 18,8 18,4 41,6 13,2 11,6 16,8 22,4 27,33 
0,06 64,0 51,2 23,6 34,4 47,2 14,8 5,6 20,0 38,4 33,24 
0,07 68,8 63,2 16,8 55,2 51,2 14,8 3,6 26,4 49,6 38,84 
0,08 71,2 66,4 17,6 72,0 48,0 28,8 3,6 32,0 62,4 44,67 
0,09 74,4 69,6 16,0 77,6 50,4 36,0 2,4 36,8 71,2 48,27 
0,1 76,0 72,0 18,0 79,2 52,0 46,4 3,2 38,4 72,0 50,80 
0,11 77,6 74,4 26,0 80,0 59,2 56,8 5,6 45,6 72,0 55,24 
0,12 78,4 77,6 32,4 80,0 60,0 64,8 13,6 54,4 72,8 59,33 
Table 6: Threshold failure ratio comparison results for all gestures using Angle Error Algorithm 
In the case of the angle error algorithm were obtained similar results as the previous, as the smaller 
the threshold the more precise were the algorithm results, but in this case the average threshold 
ratio was not as successful showing a bigger average failure ratio than the previous algorithm 
22,09%. 
 
Thresholds 
Gesture 
1 
Gesture 
2 
Gesture 
3 
Gesture 
4 
Gesture 
5 
Gesture 
6 
Gesture 
7 
Gesture 
8 
Gesture 
9 
Average 
Ratio 
AvgThreshold 19,6 30,4 12,4 29,2 63,6 13,2 8,8 13,6 8,8 22,18 
20000 19,6 25,2 18,0 22,8 20,4 18,8 16,8 18,0 8,8 18,71 
30000 22,8 27,6 18,0 26,8 23,6 19,6 14,8 14,0 4,8 19,11 
40000 17,2 30,4 18,0 30,8 26,0 20,4 10,8 12,0 0,8 18,49 
50000 14,8 33,6 18,0 30,4 30,8 20,4 6,8 12,4 3,2 18,93 
60000 17,6 29,2 18,8 31,2 37,2 16,4 3,6 10,8 9,6 19,38 
70000 24,0 28,8 18,8 30,4 46,0 12,4 3,6 12,0 17,6 21,51 
80000 36,8 32,4 18,8 29,6 49,2 13,2 4,4 12,4 29,6 25,16 
90000 44,8 35,6 18,8 29,2 51,6 13,2 4,4 12,0 40,8 27,82 
100000 53,6 41,2 18,8 31,2 54,4 13,2 4,4 13,6 44,0 30,49 
110000 57,6 43,6 18,8 32,8 54,0 13,2 5,2 15,2 47,2 31,96 
120000 59,2 42,4 17,6 34,4 57,2 13,2 5,2 16,0 52,0 33,02 
130000 68,0 44,8 15,6 35,2 58,8 13,2 6,8 16,8 56,0 35,02 
140000 73,6 46,8 15,6 38,4 58,4 12,8 5,6 16,8 57,6 36,18 
150000 76,0 45,6 12,4 41,6 60,0 11,6 6,4 17,6 60,0 36,80 
160000 77,6 48,0 8,4 43,2 62,4 14,8 7,2 19,2 64,8 38,40 
170000 77,6 48,0 10,0 47,2 64,0 18,0 8,8 21,6 67,2 40,27 
180000 79,2 48,8 10,8 49,6 63,6 18,8 9,6 23,2 69,6 41,47 
190000 79,2 52,0 12,4 52,8 62,4 19,6 11,2 23,2 70,4 42,58 
200000 79,2 56,0 12,4 56,0 62,4 22,8 13,6 24,0 72,0 44,27 
Table 5: Threshold failure ratio comparison results for all gestures using DP-Matching over the Euclidean Distance 
Algorithm 
Using DP-Matching to process the results obtained through the Euclidean Distance Error algorithm, it 
is noticeable a decrease in the range between best threshold values showing more focus between 
20000 and 40000 score, making it more viable for use of static value threshold instead of the average 
threshold, but overall the failure ratios were higher in this method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Thresholds 
Gesture 
1 
Gesture 
2 
Gesture 
3 
Gesture 
4 
Gesture 
5 
Gesture 
6 
Gesture 
7 
Gesture 
8 
Gesture 
9 
Average 
Ratio 
AvgThreshold 18,8 42,4 16,8 23,2 66,4 13,2 11,6 14,4 10,8 24,18 
0,01 18,8 20,4 18,0 20,4 18,0 18,8 19,6 18,0 18,8 18,98 
0,02 16,8 30,8 18,0 26,4 30,0 19,6 19,6 18,8 10,8 21,20 
0,03 25,6 45,6 18,8 14,4 44,4 21,2 19,6 14,4 0,8 22,76 
0,04 49,6 50,0 18,8 38,4 62,8 15,2 15,6 14,8 5,6 30,09 
0,05 77,6 60,0 19,6 68,8 65,6 14,0 11,6 17,6 35,2 41,11 
0,06 79,2 62,4 26,0 76,8 66,4 20,4 3,6 24,8 56,0 46,18 
0,07 79,2 65,6 16,8 77,6 66,4 28,4 6,8 28,0 63,2 48,00 
0,08 79,2 69,6 18,8 80,0 67,2 39,2 10,8 34,4 70,4 52,18 
0,09 80,0 74,4 24,4 80,0 74,4 56,0 18,4 44,8 74,4 58,53 
0,1 80,0 76,0 34,8 80,0 76,8 65,6 28,0 59,2 78,4 64,31 
0,11 80,0 78,4 45,2 80,0 78,4 71,2 37,6 68,0 80,0 68,76 
0,12 80,0 78,4 58,0 80,0 80,0 74,4 41,6 76,0 80,0 72,04 
Table 7: Threshold failure ratio comparison results for all gestures using DP-Matching over the Angle Error 
Algorithm 
Finally applying DP-Matching over the Angle Error obtained results with a similar range for optimal 
static thresholds, but the average threshold ratio gave a result of 24.18 which is the highest of all 
tested so far. 
From this it was observed that the threshold variations would depend mostly on two main factors: 
• Gesture size: even the attempts by the same user for the same password will vary in size, the 
more the size varies the less precision we can expect from the result. 
• Gesture complexity: the more complex the gesture the harder to repeat it, gestures way too 
complex may create a very difficult to repeat setting even by the same user, creating a 
threshold too big that will end up worsening the differentiation between gestures. 
Considering these two factors, it was decided that a good way to identify if a new gesture created 
by a user is optimal for use as a password or not. This inconsistency score is obtained through 
the formula:  Inconsistency = Average Complexity/ Model Gesture Size.  
A high inconsistency score is a sign that the user most likely failed at replicating his own gesture 
during gesture creation or that the created gesture is too complex to be easily replicated through 
human movement, while a low consistency score means that the user was able to replicate his 
created gesture perfectly. A maximum inconsistency score should be used to help decide if the 
user should retry creating his password or not. During this test a few of the comparisons that had 
biggest failure ratio scores were performed in gestures with a consistency score over 1000, so it 
was decided to use this as a maximum for the next test. 
Algorithm Efficiency Comparison for all the gestures 
From the previously obtained data we could compare the efficiency of each algorithm, by comparing 
how many gestures would be scored as true positives or negatives with different threshold values. As 
the average threshold obtained revealed to be quite close to the ideal threshold for each gesture, this 
was used as the main threshold for the efficiency comparison.  
  Table 8: Algorithm comparison results obtained from using the calculated average threshold 
It can be verified that the for the set of gestures tested in this system the optimal algorithm to use in 
the Hidden Gesture password tests would be the Euclidean distance algorithm with the threshold 
calculated from the average consistency of the user’s input, as the Euclidean distance obtained the 
biggest quantity of true values. 
Note that although in this test the results obtained through DP-Matching were inferior to the ones 
obtained without it, this can only be concluded for this project, and not for gesture processing 
systems in general, as different ways of filtering the obtained data could possibly improve the results 
obtained through DP-Matching. This test’s objective was just to find out of 4 methods used with the 
sample data obtained with the project would work better for the gesture comparison with the hidden 
button gesture. 
 
4.2. Hidden Button Gesture efficiency against shoulder-surfing 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this was to test the efficiency of the Hidden Button Gesture system in a worst case 
scenario shoulder-surfing case, in which the attackers are in close range to the victim able to witness 
the whole user interaction with a Wii Remote using it for a password, and to compare how the 
hidden gesture improves the security over a normal gesture password. 
The users were asked to think of a gesture that would be used as a password in the Hidden Button 
Gesture application. It was explained to them that during the gesture input they would be asked to 
press the A button on the Wii Remote, and that only that part while the button was pressed would be 
the actual authentication password, being important that they would try to remember with some 
precision the parts of the gesture where they started and stop holding the button. They were then 
asked to use the Hidden Button Gesture application, by entering a username followed by the creation 
of their personal hidden gesture using the Wii Remote, holding the A button during the important 
part of the gesture, and pressing the B button at any time to finish the gesture recording. 
  
False 
Negatives 
True 
Positives 
True 
Negatives 
False 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
Ratio 
False 
Positive 
Ratio 
Failure 
Ratio 
Euclidean 
Distance 38 52 835 65 42,2 7,2 14,2 
Angle  
Error 47 43 779 121 52,2 13,4 21,2 
Euclidean 
Distance 
 DP-Matching 41 49 753 147 45,6 16,3 22,2 
Angle Error 
DP-Matching 48 42 775 125 53,3 13,9 21,8 
 While one of the users was entering his hidden gesture password, the other users would act as 
shoulder-surfers trying to memorize and figure what was the hidden gesture through observation 
from a short distance of about 1m. Some minutes after each observation event each of the shoulder 
surfers was asked to try to copy the hidden gesture password up to 5 attempts each. 
Finally, in order to test the effectiveness and short term memorability of the hidden gesture the 
initial user was asked to try login again 1 hour after the password creation, attempting this 5 times. 
 
4.2.2 Demographics 
The testers selected for this test were 3 males and 1 female with ages between 23 and 27, they all 
had previous experience with the usage of a Wii Remote. 
 
4.2.3 Collected Data 
In order to collect and compare the information of obtained from each hidden button gesture with 
normal gestures, the Hidden Button Gesture application was set to save the gesture data in two ways 
at the same time: 
- The entire gesture movement from the start of the gesture to the B button pressing to finish 
the gesture, recording the gesture as if it had no hidden button press. 
- The hidden gesture password data that was only recorded during the time the user was 
holding the A button on the Wii Remote. 
Considering this, two sets of results were obtained for each attempt at replicating the recorded 
gesture password.  The results were organized in tables that show how consistent the user was when 
entering the password, the amount of true positives and false negatives when the user was asked to 
attempt login again after 1 hour, and the amount of failed and successful shoulder-surfing attempts. 
Obtaining the failure ratio in the same way as the previous test, in which a lower amount of false 
positives is considered more important to get than medium amount of false negatives. 
Data set 1: Gesture password without hidden button pressing 
 
 
Consistency 
Score 
False 
Negatives 
True 
Positives 
True 
Negatives 
False 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
Rate % 
False 
Positive 
Rate % 
Failure 
Ratio 
User 1 972,8 2 2 14 1 50,0 6,7 15,3 
User 2 93,4 2 2 12 3 50,0 20,0 26,0 
User 3 77,5 1 3 14 1 25,0 6,7 10,3 
User 4 94 2 2 14 1 50,0 6,7 15,3 
Table 9: Comparison of the results for each user gesture without the hidden button 
As we can see the in Table 9 for each of the gestures there was at least one successful shoulder-surf 
attack, being the 2nd user the one with the most amount of false positives, also should be noticed that 
the user that was most consistent in this had the highest amount of true positives. 
We can conclude that for each of the users at least one of the shoulder-surfers managed to 
authenticate as if he was the original user at least once, the worst case being the gesture of user nº 2 
which was replicated 3 times 
Data set 2: Hidden Button Gesture 
 
 
Consistency 
Score 
False 
Negatives 
True 
Positives 
True 
Negatives 
False 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
Ratio 
False 
Positive 
Ratio 
Failure 
Ratio 
User 1 998 2 2 15 0 50,0 0,0 10,0 
User 2 41 1 3 15 0 25,0 0,0 5,0 
User 3 94 2 2 14 1 50,0 6,7 15,3 
User 4 117 2 2 15 0 50,0 0,0 10,0 
Table 10: Comparison of the results for each user gesture without the hidden button 
Looking at the results obtained only when the A button was being pressed. We can see that there was 
significant decrease in the amount of successful shoulder surfing attacks, while keeping a similar 
amount of true positives. We can also notice that most of the consistency scores changed 
considerably showing that: user 2 was more consistent during the button press, than during the 
entire gesture process where he was not pressing the button, therefore even though his normal 
gesture could was the easiest to copy in the common gesture password; it became safe in this one. 
The only user whose hidden gesture was discovered once was user 3, but this was probably due to 
his gesture being composed of mostly button pressing without releasing from the start, while the 
others attempts lasted less, making it more obvious for the shoulder surfers to get even accidentally 
by just trying to hold the button during the entire gesture. The common 50% false negative ratio, 
might still prove to be an annoyance to some users and it is possible that during longer periods of 
time this would increase due to forgetfulness, and actual body changes. Although this could be 
increased or decreased through editing the way the threshold is calculated, increasing it to decrease 
security but have more tolerance to input errors, or decreasing it to have a much more secure 
system. 
During this test the actions of the users were observed to verify if there were any problems in using 
the button while creating the gesture as they had previously used a gesture system. It was observed 
that every one of the users managed to follow the instructions given, and successfully create their 
own hidden button gesture, having only one of them created a gesture with a high (over 500) yet still 
tolerable inconsistency score. 
 
 
 
 4.3  Discussion 
This project explored what efforts are being done to combat shoulder-surfing, by analyzing various 
projects, and trying to formalize ideas to improve them, be it in usability or security.  
A comparison of some of the most relevant projects related to the shoulder-surfing problem were 
studied, from which was concluded that the more that is done to improve a system’s security by 
increasing its complexity, the less usable it becomes. And a system with too complex of a secret, will 
most likely have low usability and fail to be used correctly, ending up with its users practicing unsafe 
procedures, be it by writing down their secret or constantly making mistakes during the interaction, 
leading to easier attacks. Therefore a good system should always have a good balance between 
security and usability. Knowing that even a small increase on the data obtained from could 
sometimes give a considerable increase of security. Having focused further readings on recent 
gesture authentication works, came the idea of improving these through the simple addition of a 
simple button press, that would be invisible to the observer, that would confirm when the real 
authentication token was being entered.  
For these tests a gesture data comparison application was necessary to help record and verify which 
commonly used algorithms in this kind of systems would be optimal for a gesture, and how 
efficiently these algorithms work in a gesture application. From these tests a scoring system was 
created to help evaluate user inconsistency while creating a new gesture password, and an average 
threshold calculator in order to apply an optimal threshold depending on the complexity of the each 
user’s password, so that the password is always possible to replicate by the same user, but never by 
someone who doesn’t know the secret. The system was optimized so that password creation would 
filter gestures and utilize the most similar areas between different sized gestures, which proved to 
improve results as some of the false positives detected on the first user test were due to huge gesture 
size discrepancies. 
The Gesture comparison tool was then prepared to compare data obtained from hidden button 
gestures recording only data when a button was being pressed while the accelerometer was used for 
gesture creation. And a new test was done to verify if the new Hidden Button gesture scheme was an 
improvement over the typical gesture used on the same system. This test showed that just adding the 
hidden button gesture decreased the amount of false positives without decreasing the optimal 
amount of false negatives, as only one of the shoulder-surfing attempts was successful while without 
the hidden gesture all the three gestures were replicated at least once by a shoulder-surfer. 
The Hidden Button Gesture system created in this project has proven to be useful as an optional 
authentication method to combat shoulder-surfing, as the tests showed a decrease on the ratio of 
successful shoulder-surfing attacks performed with direct close range user observation on gesture 
passwords where it was only recorded the section of the gesture where the user presses the button, 
when compared with normal gestures. Even so, the gesture precision rate is still inferior over typical 
written passwords and other static data authentication types. Still it was proven that this kind of 
authentication can be used to help fight shoulder-surfing. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Comparison with other works 
As a gesture is something humans do naturally it is easy to learn and create a gesture password, 
adding the Hidden Button Gesture scheme to it improves the security without decreasing its 
usability. In this project we used only one optimal score filter to select the best section of a gesture to 
be compared with another gesture, between two gestures of close size. The gesture comparison tool 
created to test these gestures helped to verify and select an optimal algorithm to test this kind of 
gesture input. 
 
6.2 Future Work 
From what was learned in this project, further investigation could be done to improve combating 
shoulder-surfing in gesture password, and even in other similar kind of authentication systems.  
The same system could be tested with multiple hidden presses instead of just one during the 
password, although this could lead to unwanted complexity.  
The hidden button press could also be added to other types of authentication that might involve 
interaction with devices that may hold buttons.  
Other secondary channels of authentication could be explored in gesture authentication like spatial 
positioning detected through infra-red sensors, or video input received from a camera during the 
authentication process. 
To obtain more precision in the comparison, the hidden button gesture could be tested with multiple 
types of data filtering and gesture data comparison algorithms, further investigation could be done 
researching the optimal algorithms and data filtering to be used with the hidden button press, or 
other secondary channels of authentication. 
Finally to improve reliability of this kind of gesture system over time, as it people change physically 
over long periods of time and that might decrease the amount of successful logins, the gesture 
authentication system could be improved with machine learning, recording every single new gesture 
password and selecting a new model gesture from more recent sets. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The Hidden Button Gesture authentication technique became a reality on the theme of gesture and 
motion related authorization schemes. And proved that just a small addition of a secondary channel 
of authentication, like a hidden button press, can improve greatly the security, of the system while 
not adding too much complexity that would make the system unusable. 
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